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Abstract
The surge of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden is often related to
lawlessness and poverty in Somalia. We set up a simple model to
describe the choice of becoming a pirate in a setting with an industri-
alized and a developing country which both engage in ﬁshing in the
same waters. As a result of ﬁshing competition, maritime piracy as
an alternative to ﬁshing becomes more attractive in the developing
country. We further investigate possible measures for the industrial-
ized country to deal with piracy.
JEL classiﬁcation: F22, D78, P48
Keywords: Maritime Piracy, Expropriation, Migration
∗RWTH Aachen University, Faculty of Business and Economics, Templergraben 64,
52062 Aachen, Germany, phone: ++49 241 80 93 93 1, email: lena.calahorrano@rwth-
aachen.deTo board the Sirius Star, one of the world’s largest oil tankers,
Somali pirates had to haul themselves up ropes tied to grapnel
hooks the height of London’s Big Ben, with the 330-meter (1,100
feet) long ship pitching all the while in the tropical swell. Then
there was the location, way out in the high seas, fully 450 nautical
miles oﬀ the coast of Kenya. The feat of vertiginous thuggery
will be taken everywhere as proof of what is possible; it was the
biggest ever catch by any pirate, anywhere in the world.
– Economist, November 20, 2008
1 Introduction
Maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean has in the last
years become a growing concern for the Western world. On November 20,
2008, the Economist wrote that “the attacks [by Somali pirates] increase the
threat against merchant shipping to levels not seen since the second world
war.” On November 30, 2009, UN Security Council Resolution 1897 (2009)
prolonged for another year the rights of other States to “enter the territorial
waters of Somalia” and to “use all necessary means to repress acts of piracy”,
initially granted for a period of six months by UN Security Council Resolution
1816 (2008).
The surge of piracy oﬀ the Somali coast is certainly related both to the
limited capacity of its Transitional Federal Government to impose law and
order and to limited economic opportunities and poverty of its people. Fur-
thermore, lawlessness has apparently facilitated overﬁshing by rich countries,
further reducing the economic opportunities of local ﬁshermen.
In our paper, we set up a simple theoretical model of an industrialized
and a developing country which both ﬁsh in the same waters to shed light on
diﬀerent short or medium term measures the industrialized country may take
to counter piracy. In order to tackle the causes of piracy, economic and polit-
ical stability in Somalia would have to be achieved. There is ample work on
conﬂict and development, see e.g. World Bank (2003) or World Bank (2010),
and it is clear that there are no panaceas. Collier et al. (2004) show that low
per-capita income and high inequality lengthen civil war, backing the case
for economic development. In contrast, the duration of civil war and conﬂict
is shortened by declines in prices of the commodities a country exports and
by external military intervention according to Collier et al. (2004). Since
the Somali pirates are not to date a group involved in political conﬂict there,
their high incomes need not actually fuel the conﬂict in Somalia. Bigombe
1et al. (2000), Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) and Chauvet and Collier (2005) fur-
ther discuss strategies for (post-)conﬂict governments and the international
community to reduce the risk of conﬂict and achieve economic development.
For instance, Chauvet and Collier (2005) argue that during conﬂict aid for
post-primary education can be useful.
One additional concern with piracy is that while it undermines state insti-
tutions and may fuel conﬂict, it contributes to people’s incomes and thereby
to economic development. Questions of tackling piracy and achieving devel-
opment in Somalia are thus intimately linked. Tentative conclusions may
be drawn from the experience of countries where illegal drugs play a major
role for individual incomes. Angrist and Kugler (2005) show that in Colom-
bia, increases in coca production generated economic gains in rural areas.
Meanwhile economic spillovers were small, and conﬂict was indeed fueled.
Byrd (2008) emphasizes that in Afghanistan the opium economy has created
a Dutch disease problem with overall labor incomes rising but productivity
remaining low. A similar problem is to be expected with Somali piracy. An-
other similarity is that while actions against the opium economy were often
eﬀective locally, they encouraged shifts in productions sites. While attacks
by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden have gone down in 2009, a number of
attacks have occurred far oﬀ the Somali coast.1 Byrd (2008) strongly sug-
gests mainstreaming counter-narcotics and development in Afghanistan and
taking adverse side eﬀects of policies into account, focusing prosecution on
the larger drug traﬃckers and their sponsors, encouraging those individuals
most likely to have alternatives to move away from drug production, and
supporting sensible long-run rural development.
Tackling piracy in the short or medium term can involve making piracy
more costly or making alternative occupations more attractive. We ﬁrst
investigate a reduction of ﬁshing activities. The second measure is the (mili-
tary or judicial) prosecution of pirates. Third, we consider an increase in the
number of admitted immigrants from the developing country. The judicial
or military prosecution of pirates makes piracy a more costly occupation.
Reducing ﬁsh production and increasing immigration make alternative occu-
pations more attractive.
The western world’s response to maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden
has been mainly military, see UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008)
and European Union (2010), with recently intensiﬁed eﬀorts to overcome
problems of prosecuting pirates in court, see UN Security Council Resolution
1897 (2009). Kontorovich (2010) analyzes these judicial problems. He claims
that while international law has required states to ﬁght maritime piracy for
1ICC International Maritime Bureau (2009)
2a long time, “international legal norms that limit state authority and pro-
vide greater protections for individuals”(Kontorovich 2010, p.6) have made
prosecution costly enough to prevent it in many cases. Leeson (2009b) ar-
gues that the elimination of large-scale maritime piracy in the 18th century
was mainly due to legal changes allowing the prosecution of pirates in the
British colonies, but that in dealing with modern pirates it should be taken
into account that pirates have always developed rational strategies for cir-
cumventing the law. We take a look at ﬁshery policies since illegal ﬁshing by
industrialized countries’ trawlers oﬀ the Somali coast has been documented2
and is often used by pirates as an excuse for charging “ﬁnes”. Migration is
important in the context of Somalia, as the country has been characterized by
mass emigration since the collapse of its government in 1991. Furthermore,
remittances seem to play an important role in Somalia’s economy, as Munzele
Maimbo (2006) shows. However, we do not explicitly model remittances.
While historians and sociologists have long dealt with questions relating
to maritime piracy (see e.g. the University of Amsterdam’s program Piracy
and Robbery in the Asian Seas), research in Economics on the subject is
scarcer. A notable exception is Peter Leeson, who has written extensively on
the functioning of pirate societies, see e.g. Leeson (2007), Leeson (2009a) and
Leeson (2009b). Two additional contributions to the economics of maritime
piracy have been published relatively recently. In an empirical investigation
Mejia Jr. et al. (2009) ﬁnd that the probability of being attacked by pirates
between 1996 and 2005 signiﬁcantly depended on the type of vessel, with
vessels with a low freeboard and vessels under Asian ﬂag being attacked
more frequently.3 Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) show in a theoretical
model how endogenous piracy can act as a barrier to trade.
We model the decision to become a pirate in section 2 and analyze the
eﬀectiveness and feasibility of diﬀerent policies in section 3. Section 4 con-
cludes.
2 Becoming a Pirate
We consider a static setting with two countries, an industrialized country (IC)
and a developing country (DC). Both countries engage in the production of















, β < 1 .
2see e.g. Economist (2008)
3According to ICC International Maritime Bureau (2008) the highest number of attacks
in the years 2003 until 2006 occurred in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Malacca Straits.
3The asterisk denotes the developing country’s variables. We abstract from
capital as a production factor for simplicity. The production of ﬁsh is sub-
ject to diminishing returns to scale, since ﬁsh is an exhaustible good. Fur-
thermore, production decreases with the other country’s labor input. The
intuition is that both countries ﬁsh from the same stock of ﬁsh - even though
in reality property rights are clearly deﬁned, a country like Somalia is not
capable of enforcing them. We normalize the developing country’s labor pro-
ductivity to 1, while we allow the industrialized country’s labor productivity
A to be larger or equal to 1. N and N∗ are the sizes of the native popu-
lations, and individuals exogenously supply one unit of labor, such that in
the absence of piracy LF = N and L∗
F = N∗. We assume the industrialized
country to be at least as large as the developing country, that is N ≥ N∗.








Next, we add the option of becoming a pirate to the model. The devel-
oping country’s citizens may either engage in ﬁsh production or in piracy.
We then have N∗ = L∗
F + L∗
P. We deﬁne piracy “production” Φ as the ex-
propriation of some of the industrialized country’s consumption good. We
believe that this captures the observed extortion of ransoms by Somali pi-
rates in a tractable way, without having to abandon the assumption of a
single consumption good. Φ is increasing in the number of pirates L∗
P, but
it is independent from the industrialized country’s ﬁsh production. The idea
is that the piracy sector is small compared to world ﬁsh production and can




α < F , α ≤ 1 .
The parameter ϕ denotes the pirates’ productivity in expropriating. Note
that, as the industrialized country’s productivity in ﬁsh production increases,
ﬁshing becomes less attractive for a developing country native, whereas the
attractivity of piracy is independent from F, since Φ is always smaller than
F.
















4If piracy increased in the industrialized country’s production, the migration of workers
to the industrialized country would make piracy more proﬁtable for the remaining workers
in the developing country.
4respectively. We assume utility to be linear in consumption. Furthermore,
becoming a pirate involves a disutility d. The intuition is that stealing is
considered immoral. The parameter d may also incorporate the adverse legal
consequences of becoming a pirate. Clearly, in a “failed state” these legal
consequences can be expected to be relatively unimportant.
The developing country’s natives decide whether to work as ﬁshermen or
as pirates. Setting c∗
P − d = c∗













α−1 + d = 0 . (1)
One cause of the high number of Somali pirates is the absence of a functioning
state in Somalia. When individuals do not expect to be held responsible for
committing acts of piracy, the disutility attached to being a pirate certainly
decreases. Another cause is poverty or a lack of alternative occupations.
As described above, large-scale ﬁshing by industrialized countries may have
reduced incomes of Somali ﬁshermen and thereby have made piracy a more
attractive option. Consequently, the number of pirates in (1) can be shown
to increase with A and decrease with d. Furthermore, the number of pirates
increases with the productivity ϕ achieved in robbery.
Our setting is static; however, productivity changes can be interpreted in
a chronological way, as ﬁgure 1 shows. As long as both countries have a low
No Pirates
A low, ϕ low
Some Pirates
A high, ϕ low
Many Pirates
A high, ϕ high
t
Figure 1: Chronological Model Interpretation
productivity in ﬁsh production, it is worthwhile for natives of both countries
to engage in ﬁshing. Now, if the industrialized country becomes a lot more
productive in ﬁshing, the developing country’s ﬁshermen’s production drops
and it may pay for them to become pirates instead. This may not bother the
industrialized country, as long as the pirates’ productivity is low. Imagine
the pirates themselves becoming more productive over time, as seems to have
happened in Somalia. Letting the pirates rob them might then not be optimal
for the industrialized country’s natives anymore. The same argument holds
concerning lawlessness in Somalia. Lawlessness may not bother the industrial
country as long as pirates are relatively unproductive.
53 Piracy Control
A surge in piracy has two eﬀects on the industrialized country’s per capita
consumption. First, it lowers competition in the ﬁshing sector. This eﬀect is
positive but small if the industrialized country is much larger and much more
productive in ﬁshing than the developing country. Second, it reduces the
share of the ﬁshing sector’s output which actually reaches the industrialized
country’s natives. The change in per capita consumption when the number


















The parameters α, ϕ and β also inﬂuence the size of the two eﬀects. The
larger the marginal productivity of pirates and the smaller the marginal
productivity of ﬁshermen, the more prominent becomes the negative eﬀect.
We assume the conditions for dc/dL∗
P < 0 to be fulﬁlled. Otherwise, there is
no need for the industrialized country to consider tackling piracy.
We now investigate how diﬀerent approaches to ﬁghting piracy aﬀect the
industrialized country’s per capita consumption. First, we consider the in-
dustrialized country’s option of reducing its own ﬁsh production. Second, we
investigate the impact of expenditures on the military (or judicial) prosecu-
tion of pirates, which we model as reducing the productivity of pirates (or
increasing the disutility related to piracy). Third, we integrate endogenous
immigration policy into our model, and analyze the relationship between
emigration from the developing country and the number of pirates there.
3.1 Reducing Fish Production
If the industrialized country uses less eﬀective methods for extracting the
stock of ﬁsh, the consumption level which the developing country’s natives
achieve by ﬁshing increases, making ﬁshing more attractive relative to piracy.
Obviously, the industrialized country’s output drops when less eﬀective ﬁsh-
ing methods are employed. If the pirates’ productivity has risen in time,
going back to ﬁshing less of the exhaustible stock of ﬁsh will not establish
the previous equilibrium. In principle, per capita consumption in the indus-







βF (N∗ − L∗)





































+ (1 − α)ϕ(L∗
P)
α−2 > 0
can be derived using the implicit function theorem. The ﬁrst term in equa-
tion (3) is the positive eﬀect of an increase in the productivity A on ﬁshing
production. With dL∗
P/dA > 0, the second eﬀect is the increase in industri-
alized country ﬁshing output due to a lower number of developing country
ﬁshermen, and the third eﬀect is the increase in the output stolen by pirates
due to a higher number of pirates. We know from equation (2) that the sum
of the last two terms is negative. Reducing ﬁshing productivity can thus only
increase per capita consumption in the industrialized country if the resulting
drop in the number of pirates is very large. Note that it does increase per
capita consumption in the developing country.
Figure 2 illustrates a numerical example. For a population size of N = 10
in the industrialized country and N∗ = 1 in the developing country, for
productivity parameters α = 0.9 and β = 0.7, such that decreasing returns to
scale are more severe in ﬁshing than in piracy, and for ϕ = 0.02 and d = 0.01,
increases in ﬁshing productivity A only increase per capita consumption in
the industrialized country up to a level of A just below 30. On the one hand,
very eﬀective methods of ﬁshing only lead to small increases in the number
of catch, due to the exhaustible stock of ﬁsh. On the other hand, ever more
developing country natives turn to piracy as the stock of ﬁsh diminishes.
3.2 Military or Judicial Prosecution of Pirates
Military expenditures E can be modeled in two ways, either in terms of
output or in terms of labor. We choose the second option. This means that
part of the industrialized country’s labor force is not employed in production
















Furthermore, we assume dϕ/dE < 0, although we do not quantify this change
for now. An increase in military expenditures or eﬀorts then has four eﬀects




















































(b) Extent of piracy


























+ (1 − α)ϕ(L∗
P)α−2
< 0 .
Fish production in the industrialized country drops due to the lower number
of natives employed in ﬁshing and to the higher number of developing country
ﬁshermen. Nevertheless, per capita consumption may increase because the
pirates’ productivity is lower and because there are less pirates. An additional
concern with respect to the military persecution of pirates is that, while it
makes piracy less attractive, it does not raise the consumption level of the
developing country’s natives.
In order to illustrate the eﬀect of deploying some workers in the military
on per capita consumption, we have to assume a functional form for the
pirates’ productivity parameter ϕ. With




productivity is equal to a in the absence of military expenditure and zero
when all industrialized country natives are employed in the military. In
ﬁgure 3 the parameter values are the same as the ones used for ﬁgure 2, a is
set to 0.02 and A to 30. For these parameter values, the beneﬁts of military
expenditures initially exceed their costs in terms of per capita consumption.
The judicial prosecution of pirates is also costly for the industrialized
country. As in the case of military expenditures, expenditures on legally
prosecuting pirates can be modeled in terms of output or of labor. The only
diﬀerence is that instead of the pirates’ productivity the disutility related to
becoming a pirate is directly aﬀected. The term (dϕ/dE)(L∗
P)α in equation

























+ (1 − α)ϕ(L∗
P)α−2
< 0 .
An upper bound to what the judicial persecution of pirates can achieve can
be calculated by assuming that maximum judicial expenditures induce an
inﬁnite disutility d. The disutility parameter can then be expressed as follows:












(a) Per capita consumption in the industrialized country








(b) Extent of piracy
Figure 3: Eﬀects of of military expenditures










(a) Per capita consumption in the industrialized country









(b) Extent of piracy
Figure 4: Eﬀects of of judicial expenditures
11Again, for illustration we use the same parameter values as before, in-
cluding b = 0.01 and A = 30. Under the assumption that piracy control
expenditures reduce the disutility related to becoming a pirate instead of
the pirates’ productivity, the number of pirates seems to decline much more
rapidly. However, this rapid decline is contingent on the assumed functional
form for d(E).
3.3 Immigration Policy
We start this subsection by considering migration motives and immigration
policy in a setting without piracy. Immigrants are assumed to be less pro-
ductive than natives when employed in the industrialized country’s ﬁsh pro-
duction and therefore also to have a lower consumption level than natives.
For simplicity, we assume that the immigrants’ productivity is just equal
to 1, the same as their productivity in the home country. The developing
country’s young have an incentive to migrate, for any A > 1 or N > N∗,
until c∗ = cM, where cM is the consumption level of the immigrants. Fish













and the natives’ and immigrants’ consumption levels in the industrialized














In the absence of immigration constraints, the level of migration equalizing
consumption c∗ and cM is M = (AN − N∗)/2. Even though production
in the industrialized country clearly increases with immigration, per capita




= −(1 − β)
AF|M
(AN + M)
2 < 0 . (5)
In the presence of piracy, the industrialized country’s natives have an
additional motive for admitting immigrants, as long as dL∗
P/dM < 0. Using

















+ (1 − α)ϕ(L∗
P)α−2
< 0 .
Piracy decreases because the ﬁshing output now has to be shared among a
lower number of workers, even though the ﬁshing output itself also decreases.
























































We can distinguish four eﬀects. As in the setting without piracy, output
has to be shared among a higher number of people. This can be seen from
the ﬁrst line of (6). Output increases due to the higher number of workers
but competition in ﬁshing also increases, as can be seen from the second
line. Finally, “net” output increases because there are less pirates. From
equation (7) it follows that immigration is more likely to increase per capita
consumption, the higher piracy output Φ and the larger the drop in the
number of pirates due to emigration from the developing country.
For our benchmark parameter values, admitting more immigrants unam-
biguously increases per capita consumption in the industrialized country, see
ﬁgure 5.
3.4 Comparison
The consumption levels resulting from the diﬀerent policy choices are not
directly comparable. In ﬁgures 3, 4 and 5 the industrialized country’s ﬁshing
productivity is set to its optimal level. Therefore, the intercept on the c-axis
corresponds to maximum per capita consumption in ﬁgure 2. Furthermore,
the depicted levels of per capita consumption c and piracy L∗
P are highly
sensitive to the assumptions concerning ϕ(E) and d(E).









(a) Per capita consumption in the industrialized country






(b) Extent of piracy
Figure 5: Eﬀects of increasing immigration
144 Conclusion
In this paper we model piracy as the result of an increase in ﬁshing by a rich
country, reducing the poor country’s ﬁshermen’s consumption levels and of a
decrease in (legal) costs related to piracy. In order to tackle the “Gulf of Aden
Buccaneers”, rich countries have the option to make piracy more costly (e.g.
by persecuting pirates) or to make alternative occupations more attractive.
This paper compares the impact of several short or medium-term measures
on piracy and on well-being in the industrialized country, measured by per
capita consumption. An evaluation of the combination of diﬀerent mea-
sures remains to be done. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to explicitly
take into account additional sectors in the economy, sectors which may grow
due to remittances or human capital. Furthermore, a two-country model
is too simple to capture several additional issues. For example, counter-
piracy measures are a public good and are thus likely to be undersupplied
in an international context. Additionally, increasing the number of admitted
immigrants from Somalia to industrialized countries as a means to counter
maritime piracy may have perverse eﬀects on other conﬂict countries.
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